Special Report: Syria intervention plans fueled by oil interests, not chemical weapon concerns
On 21
August, hundreds - perhaps over a thousand - people were killed in a chemical weapon attack in Ghouta, Damascus, prompting the U.S., UK, Israel and
France to raise the spectre of military strikes against Bashir al Assad's
forces which, they say, carried out the attack.
To be
sure, the latest episode is merely one more horrific event in a conflict that
has increasingly taken on genocidal characteristics. The case for
action at first glance is indisputable. The UN now confirms a death toll over
100,000 people, the vast majority of whom have been killed by Assad's troops.
An estimated 4.5 million people have been displaced from their homes.
International observers have overwhelmingly
confirmed Assad's
complicity in the preponderance of war crimes and crimes against humanity
against the Syrian people. The illegitimacy of his regime, and the legitimacy
of the uprising against it, is clear.
But
the interests of the west are a different matter.
Chemical confusion
While
the U.S. and Israel have taken a lead in claiming firm evidence that the latest
attack was indeed a deployment of chemical weapons by Assad's regime,
justifying a military intervention of some sort, questions remain.
The
main evidence cited by the U.S. linking the attacks to Syria are intercepted
phone calls among other intelligence, the bulk of which was provided by Israel. "Last Wednesday, in the
hours after a horrific chemical attack east of Damascus," reported Foreign Policy, "an official at the
Syrian Ministry of Defense exchanged panicked phone calls with a leader of a
chemical weapons unit, demanding answers for a nerve agent strike that killed
more than 1,000 people."
This
account is hardly decisive proof of Assad's culpability in the attack - what
one can reasonably determine here is that Syrian defense officials do not seem
to have issued specific orders for such a strike, and were attempting to
investigate whether their own chemical weapons unit was indeed responsible.
On the
attack itself, experts are unanimous that the shocking footage of civilians,
including children, suffering the effects of some sort of chemical attack, is
real - but remain divided on whether it involved military-grade chemical
weapons associated with Assad's arsenal, or were a more amateur concoction
potentially linked to the rebels.
Many
independent chemical weapons experts point out the insufficiency of
evidence to
draw any firm conclusions. Steven Johnson, chemical explosives experts
at Cranfield Forensic Institute, pointed to inconsistencies in the video
footage and the symptoms displayed by victims, raising questions about the
nature of the agents used. Although trauma to the nervous system was clear:
"At this stage everyone wants a ‘yes-no’ answer to chemical attack. But it
is too early to draw a conclusion just from these videos."
Dan Kaszeta, a former officer of the U.S. Army’s Chemical
Corps, said: "None of the people treating the casualties or photographing
them are wearing any sort of chemical-warfare protective gear, and despite
that, none of them seem to be harmed... there are none of the other signs you
would expect to see in the aftermath of a chemical attack, such as intermediate
levels of casualties, severe visual problems, vomiting and loss of bowel
control."
Gwyn Winfield of chemical weapons journal CBRNe World said it
was difficult to pin down a specific chemical from the symptoms seen in
footage, but suggested it could be either a chemical weapon or a riot control
agent: "The lack of conventional munition marks does suggest that it was a
non-conventional munition, or an RCA (riot control agent) in a confined space,
but who fired it and what it was has yet to be proved."
Other experts cited by Agence France Presse (AFP) concur with these assessments - either
disagreeing that the footage proved military-grade chemical weapons, or noting
the inadequacy of evidence implicating a specific perpetrator.
What
little evidence is available in the public record on past deployment of
chemical agents has implicated both Assad and the rebels - not the Free Syrian
Army (FSA) as a whole, but rather militant jihadist factions linked to al-Qaeda
and funded by the likes of Saudi Arabia and
Qatar.
In
March this year, a major attack on the predominantly Shi'a town of Khan
al-Assal killing 26 people including civilians and Syrian soldiers was
apparently committed by rebels "with al-Qaeda sympathies." U.S.
weapons experts suspected that the victims were exposed to a
"caustic" agent such as chlorine, not a military-grade chemical
weapon but "an improvised chemical device." As the Telegraph reports: "There has been
extensive experimentation by insurgents in Iraq in the use of chlorine."
Indeed,
in May 2007, al-Qaeda in Iraq had attempted a series of suicide
attacks using
bombs built from chlorine gas containers. Last year, Syrian jihadist groups led
by the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusrah Front, linked to Iraqi al-Qaeda forces,
captured several Syrian
military bases
stocking Scud and anti-aircraft missiles, as well as a chlorine factory near Aleppo.
Yet eyewitness reports
from victims and doctors
have also alleged many other instances of chemical weapons attacks attributed
by locals to Syrian government forces.
Just
three months before the most recent attack, however, former war crimes
prosecutor Carla del Ponte, an independent UN war crimes
investigator on Syria, told Channel 4 that evidence derived from interviews
with victims, doctors and field hospitals confirmed that rebels had used the
nerve agent sarin:
"I have seen that there are concrete suspicions if not irrefutable proof that there has been use of sarin gas... This use was made by the opponent rebels and not from the governmental authorities."
According
to Channel 4, "she had not found evidence of sarin's use by President
Bashar al-Assad's regime."
Meanwhile,
the latest UN report released in June 2013 confirms
several allegations of chemical weapons attacks but concludes it:
"... has not been possible, on the evidence available, to determine the precise chemical agents used, their delivery systems or the perpetrator."
Further
complicating the matter, Dave Gavlak, a veteran Middle East
correspondent for Associated Press, cites interviews with "doctors, Ghouta
residents, rebel fighters and their families" who believe that "certain
rebels received chemical weapons via the Saudi intelligence chief, Prince
Bandar bin Sultan, and were responsible for carrying out the gas attack."
The arms were reportedly given by al-Nusrah fighters to ordinary rebels without
informing them of their nature. "More than a dozen rebels interviewed
reported that their salaries came from the Saudi government." Gavlak's
report comes with the caveat that some of its information "cannot be
independently verified."
Could it be disinformation planted by Assad
agents in Damascus, as happened with the Houla massacre?
We
will have to wait for the findings of UN weapons inspectors to see whether any
further clarity can be added with regards to the latest attack. In the words of
Foreign Policy
magazine:
"Given that U.N. inspectors with a mandate to investigate chemical weapons use were on the ground when the attack happened, the decision to deploy what appears to have been a nerve agent in a suburb east of Damascus has puzzled many observers. Why would Syria do such a thing when it is fully aware that the mass use of chemical weapons is the one thing that might require the United States to take military action against it? That's a question U.S. intelligence analysts are puzzling over as well. 'We don't know exactly why it happened,' the intelligence official said. 'We just know it was pretty fucking stupid.'"
Imperial pretensions from Syria
to Iran
U.S.
agitation against Syria began long before today's atrocities at least seven
years ago in the context of wider operations targeting Iranian influence across
the Middle East.
In
2006, a little-known State Department committee - the Iran-Syria Policy
and Operations Group
- was meeting weekly to "coordinate actions such as curtailing Iran's
access to credit and banking institutions, organizing the sale of military
equipment to Iran's neighbors and supporting forces that oppose the two
regimes." U.S. officials said "the dissolution of the group was
simply a bureaucratic reorganization" because of a "widespread public
perception that it was designed to enact regime change."
Despite
the dissolution of the group, covert action continued. In May 2007, a presidential finding revealed that Bush had
authorized "nonlethal" CIA operations against Iran. Anti-Syria
operations were also in
full swing around this time as part of this covert programme, according to
Seymour Hersh, reporting for the New Yorker. A range of U.S. government
and intelligence sources told him that the Bush administration had
"cooperated with Saudi Arabia’s government, which is Sunni, in clandestine
operations" intended to weaken the Shi'ite Hezbollah in Lebanon. "The
U.S. has also taken part in clandestine operations aimed at Iran and its ally
Syria," wrote Hersh, "a byproduct" of which is "the
bolstering of Sunni extremist groups" hostile to the United States and
"sympathetic to al-Qaeda." He noted that "the Saudi government,
with Washington’s approval, would provide funds and logistical aid to weaken
the government of President Bashir Assad, of Syria," with a view to
pressure him to be "more conciliatory and open to negotiations" with
Israel. One faction receiving covert U.S. "political and financial
support" through the Saudis was the exiled Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.
A year
later, Alexander Cockburn revealed that a new finding
authorized covert action undermining Iran "across a huge geographical are
- from Lebanon to Afghanistan", and would include support for a wide range
of terrorist and military groups such as Mujahedin-e-Khalq and Jundullah in
Balochistan, including al-Qaeda linked groups:
"Other elements that will benefit from U.S. largesse and advice include Iranian Kurdish nationalists, as well the Ahwazi arabs of south west Iran. Further afield, operations against Iran’s Hezbollah allies in Lebanon will be stepped up, along with efforts to destabilize the Syrian regime."
It is
perhaps not entirely surprising in this context that according to former French
foreign minister Roland Dumas, Britain had planned covert
action in Syria as early as 2009: "I was in England two years before the
violence in Syria on other business", he told French television:
"I met with top British officials, who confessed to me that they were preparing something in Syria. This was in Britain not in America. Britain was preparing gunmen to invade Syria. They even asked me, although I was no longer minister for foreign affairs, if I would like to participate."
Leaked
emails from the private intelligence
firm Stratfor
included notes from a meeting
with Pentagon officials
confirming U.S.-UK covert operations in Syria since 2011:
"After a couple hours of talking, they said without saying that SOF [Special Operations Forces] teams (presumably from U.S., UK, France, Jordan, Turkey) are already on the ground focused on recce [reconnaissance] missions and training opposition forces... I kept pressing on the question of what these SOF teams would be working toward, and whether this would lead to an eventual air campaign to give a Syrian rebel group cover. They pretty quickly distanced themselves from that idea, saying that the idea 'hypothetically' is to commit guerrilla attacks, assassination campaigns, try to break the back of the Alawite forces, elicit collapse from within... They don’t believe air intervention would happen unless there was enough media attention on a massacre, like the Gaddafi move against Benghazi. They think the U.S. would have a high tolerance for killings as long as it doesn't reach that very public stage."
"Collapsing"
Assad's regime is thus a final goal, though military intervention would only be
politically feasible - read domestically palatable for western populations - in
the context of "a massacre" so grievous it would lead to a public
outcry.
In another email to
Stratfor executive Fred Burton from James F. Smith, former director of Blackwater and
current CEO of another private security firm SCG International, Smith confirmed
that he was part of "a fact finding mission for Congress" being
deployed to "engage Syrian opposition in Turkey (non-MB and
non-Qatari)." The "true mission" for the "fact
finding" team was how:
"... they can help in regime change."
The
email added that Smith intended to offer "his services to help protect the
opposition members, like he had underway in Libya." He also said that Booz
Allen Hamilton - the same defence contractor that employed Edward Snowden to
run NSA surveillance programmes - "is also working [with] the Agency on a
similar request."
Grand strategy: shoring up Gulf oil autocracies, "salafi jihadism" and sectarian violence
So
what is this unfolding strategy to undermine Syria, Iran and so on, all about?
According to retired NATO Secretary
General Wesley Clark,
a memo from the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense just a few weeks after
9/11 revealed plans to "attack and destroy the governments in 7
countries in five years." A Pentagon officer familiar with the memo told
him, "we’re going to start with Iraq, and then we’re going to move to
Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Iran." In a subsequent
interview, Clark argues that this strategy is fundamentally about control of
the region's vast oil
and gas resources.
As
Glen Greenwald pointed out:
"... in the aftermath of military-caused regime change in Iraq and Libya... with concerted regime change efforts now underway aimed at Syria and Iran, with active and escalating proxy fighting in Somalia, with a modest military deployment to South Sudan, and the active use of drones in six - count ‘em: six - different Muslim countries, it is worth asking whether the neocon dream as laid out by Clark is dead or is being actively pursued and fulfilled, albeit with means more subtle and multilateral than full-on military invasions."
Indeed,
much of the strategy currently at play in the region was candidly described in
a 2008 U.S. Army-funded
RAND report, Unfolding the Future of the Long War.
The report noted that "the economies of the industrialized states will
continue to rely heavily on oil, thus making it a strategically important
resource." As most oil will be produced in the Middle East, the U.S. has
"motive for maintaining stability in and good relations with Middle
Eastern states." The report further acknowledges:
"The geographic area of proven oil reserves coincides with the power base of much of the Salafi-jihadist network. This creates a linkage between oil supplies and the long war that is not easily broken or simply characterized... For the foreseeable future, world oil production growth and total output will be dominated by Persian Gulf resources... The region will therefore remain a strategic priority, and this priority will interact strongly with that of prosecuting the long war."
In
this context, the report identitied many potential trajectories for regional
policy focused on protecting access to Gulf oil supplies, among which the
following are most salient:
"Divide and Rule focuses on exploiting fault lines between the various Salafi-jihadist groups to turn them against each other and dissipate their energy on internal conflicts. This strategy relies heavily on covert action, information operations (IO), unconventional warfare, and support to indigenous security forces... the United States and its local allies could use the nationalist jihadists to launch proxy IO campaigns to discredit the transnational jihadists in the eyes of the local populace... U.S. leaders could also choose to capitalize on the 'Sustained Shia-Sunni Conflict' trajectory by taking the side of the conservative Sunni regimes against Shiite empowerment movements in the Muslim world.... possibly supporting authoritative Sunni governments against a continuingly hostile Iran."
Exploring
different scenarios for this trajectory, the report speculated that the U.S.
may concentrate "on shoring up the traditional Sunni regimes in Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan as a way of containing Iranian power and influence
in the Middle East and Persian Gulf." Noting that this could actually
empower al-Qaeda jihadists, the report concluded that doing so might work in
western interests by focusing jihadi activity on internal sectarian rivalry
rather than targeting the U.S., thus bogging down both Iranian-sponsored groups like Hezbollah and al-Qaeda affiliated networks in mutual conflict:
"One of the oddities of this long war trajectory is that it may actually reduce the al-Qaeda threat to U.S. interests in the short term. The upsurge in Shia identity and confidence seen here would certainly cause serious concern in the Salafi-jihadist community in the Muslim world, including the senior leadership of al-Qaeda. As a result, it is very likely that al-Qaeda might focus its efforts on targeting Iranian interests throughout the Middle East and Persian Gulf while simultaneously cutting back on anti-American and anti-Western operations."
The
RAND document contextualised this strategy with surprisingly prescient
recognition of the increasing vulnerability of the U.S.'s key allies and
enemies - Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Egypt, Syria, Iran - to the converging
crises of rapidly rising populations, a 'youth bulge', internal economic
inequalities, political frustrations, sectarian tensions, and water shortages,
all of which could destabilize these countries from within or exacerbate
inter-state conflicts.
The
report noted especially that Syria is among several "downstream countries
that are becoming increasingly water scarce as their populations grow",
increasing a risk of conflict. Drought in Syria due to climate change,
impacting food prices, did indeed play a major role in sparking the 2011 uprisings.
Though the RAND document fell far short of recognizing the prospect of an 'Arab Spring', it illustrates that three
years before the 2011 uprisings, U.S. defense officials were alive to the
region's growing instabilities, and concerned by the potential consequences for
stability of Gulf oil.
Pipeline politics
These strategic concerns, motivated by fear of expanding
Iranian influence, impacted Syria primarily in relation to pipeline
geopolitics. In 2009 - the same year former French foreign minister Dumas
alleges the British began planning operations in Syria - Assad refused
to sign a proposed agreement with Qatar
that would run a pipeline from the latter's North field, contiguous with
Iran's South Pars field, through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and on to Turkey, with
a view to supply European markets - albeit crucially bypassing Russia. Assad's
rationale was "to protect the interests of [his] Russian ally, which is
Europe's top supplier of natural gas."
Instead, the following year, Assad pursued negotiations for an
alternative $10 billion pipeline plan with Iran, across Iraq to Syria, that
would also potentially allow Iran to supply gas to Europe from its South Pars
field shared with Qatar. the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the project was
signed by in July 2012 - just as Syria's civil war was spreading to Damascus
and Aleppo - and earlier this year Iraq signed a framework
agreement for construction of the gas pipelines. The pipeline would
potentially allow Iran to supply gas to European markets.
The Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline plan was a "direct
slap in the face" to Qatar's plans. No wonder Saudi Prince Bandar bin
Sultan, in a failed attempt to bribe Russia to switch sides, told President
Vladmir Putin that "whatever regime comes after" Assad, it will be "completely"
in Saudi Arabia's hands and will "not sign any agreement allowing any
Gulf country to transport its gas across Syria to Europe and compete with
Russian gas exports", according to diplomatic sources. When Putin refused,
the Prince vowed military action.
Israel
also has a direct interest in countering the Iran-brokered pipeline. In 2003,
just a month after the commencement of the Iraq War, U.S. and Israeli
government sources told The Guardian of plans to "build a
pipeline to siphon oil from newly conquered Iraq to Israel" bypassing
Syria. The basis for the plan, known as the Haifa project, goes back to a 1975
MoU signed by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, "whereby the U.S.
would guarantee Israel's oil reserves and energy supply in times of
crisis." As late as 2007, U.S. and Israeli
government officials were
in discussion on costs and contingencies for the Iraq-Israel pipeline project.
All
the parties intervening in Syria's escalating conflict - the U.S., Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Israel on one side providing limited support to
opposition forces, with Russia, China and Iran on the other shoring up Assad's
regime - are doing so for their own narrow, competing geopolitical interests.
Supporting al-Qaeda
Certainly,
external support for the rebels funneled largely through Saudi Arabia and
Qatar has empowered extremists. The New York Times found that most of the arms
supplied with U.S. approval "are going to hard-line Islamic jihadists, and
not the more secular opposition groups" - a process which continues. The support for militants is
steadily transforming the Syrian landscape. "Across Syria, rebel-held
areas are dotted with Islamic courts staffed by lawyers and clerics, and by
fighting brigades led by extremists", reported NYT in April:
"Even the Supreme Military Council, the umbrella rebel organization whose formation the West had hoped would sideline radical groups, is stocked with commanders who want to infuse Islamic law into a future Syrian government. Nowhere in rebel-controlled Syria is there a secular fighting force to speak of."
And
there are even questions about the U.S.' purported disavowal of the al-Qaeda
affiliated al-Nusra. NYT reports that "Nusra’s hand is felt most strongly
in Aleppo", where it has established in coordination with other rebel
groups "a Shariah Commission" running "a police force and an
Islamic court that hands down sentences that have included lashings."
Nusra fighters also "control the power plant and distribute flour to
keep the city’s bakeries running." Additionally, they "have seized
government oil fields" in provinces of Deir al-Zour and Hasaka, and now
make a "profit from the crude they produce."
The
problem is that al-Nusra's bakery and oil operations are being supported by the
U.S. and the European Union (EU) respectively. In one disturbing account, the Washington Post reports on a stealth mission
in Aleppo "to deliver food and other aid to needy Syrians - all of it paid
for by the U.S. government", including the supply of flour. "The
bakery is fully supplied with flour paid for by the United States", the
report continues, noting that local consumers, however, "credited Jabhat
al-Nusra - a rebel group the United States has designated a terrorist
organization because of its ties to al-Qaeda - with providing flour to the
region, though he admitted he wasn’t sure where it comes from." Similarly,
the EU's easing of an
oil embargo to
allow oil imports from rebel-controlled oil fields directly benefits al-Nusra
fighters who control those former government fields.
No
wonder Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan, in a failed attempt to bribe Russia to
switch sides, told President Vladmir Putin that "whatever regime comes
after" Assad, it will be "completely"
in Saudi Arabia's hands
and will "not sign any agreement allowing any Gulf country to transport
its gas across Syria to Europe and compete with Russian gas exports",
according to diplomatic sources. When Putin refused, the Prince vowed military
action.
It
would seem that contradictory Saudi and Qatari oil interests are pulling the
strings of U.S. policy in Syria, if not the wider region. It is this - the
problem of establishing a pliable opposition which the U.S. and its oil allies
feel confident will play ball, pipeline-style, in a post-Assad Syria - that
will determine the nature of any prospective intervention. As Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey, said:
"Syria today is not about choosing between two sides but rather about choosing one among many sides. It is my belief that the side we choose must be ready to promote their interests and ours when the balance shifts in their favor."
What
is beyond doubt is that Assad is a war criminal whose government deserves to
be overthrown. The question is by whom, and for what interests?
Dr. Nafeez Ahmed is
a bestselling author, investigative journalist and international security
scholar. He is executive director of the Institute
for Policy Research & Development, and author of A User's Guide to the Crisis of
Civilization: And How to Save it among other books. He writes for The Guardian on the geopolitics of
environmental, energy and economic crises via his Earth insight blog.