Who is responsible for the Pakistan school massacre?
Depends who you ask.
The Pakistan Taliban (TTP), the breakaway
group that is spearheading an insurgency against the Pakistani state, has proudly
admitted to having executed the horrifying atrocity that took the lives of
148 innocents, including over 130 children.
US officials have been quick to point
the finger at Pakistan, noting the role of the notorious ‘S Wing’ of state
military intelligence, the ISI, in covertly sponsoring various Taliban factions
inside Afghanistan.
And Prime Minister Nawar Sharif, clearly
feeling the pressure, has for the first time ever conceded the ISI’s
duplicitous strategy and now vows that he will no longer distinguish between
‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban, but will bravely fight them all “until the last
terrorist is killed.”
Some in Pakistani diaspora communities in
the west, however, have a different view. “Mossad did it,” I’ve heard from a
surprising number of people. “To make Muslims look bad.” Others blame the CIA,
or MI6, or both – indeed, all three.
This sort of pathetic, ignorant denialism
is almost as bad as the pathetic official finger pointing.
The sad truth is that none of these actors
are free of responsibility for the murky origins of the TTP.
The
double game
It is, of course, a matter of record that
the Pakistani ISI has secretly
supported the Afghan Taliban for more than a decade, a matter I have
tracked and documented since even before 9/11. Yet from the very inception of
this policy, it has been pursued with tacit and selective US support.
In the run-up to 9/11, the idea was to use the
Taliban as a proxy on behalf of two US energy companies, Unocal and Enron,
to achieve sufficient stability to permit the construction of the Trans-Afghan
pipeline project – the Pakistani ISI, was the chief conduit of US logistical,
financial and military aid to the Taliban during this period.
Yet even after 9/11, despite US
intelligence agencies being intimately familiar with ongoing Pakistani ISI
support for the Afghan Taliban fighting NATO troops in the country, Pakistan
has continued to receive billions of dollars of military aid in the name of
counterterrorism.
Yet throughout all this US
counter-terrorism assistance, the ISI’s support of the very factions NATO
forces are fighting in Afghanistan has gone on, unimpeded. Two declassified
US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reports dated two weeks after 9/11, found
that al-Qaeda had been “able to expand under the safe sanctuary extended by
Taliban following Pakistan directives” and ISI funding.
In 2006, a leaked US Ministry
of Defence report showed that the British government was fully aware of
how: “Indirectly Pakistan (through the ISI) has been supporting terrorism and
extremism” – including being involved in the 2005 London bombings, and
insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Confidential NATO reports and US
intelligence assessments circulated to White House officials in 2008 further confirmed ongoing
ISI support for Taliban insurgents, tracing the complicity to senior ISI
officials including Pakistan’s head of military intelligence, in providing
extensive military support to Taliban camps in Balochistan and the ‘Haqqani’
network leading the insurgency around Kabul. Despite these reports being
circulated around the highest levels of the White House, senior Obama
administration officials went to pains to persuade US Congress to extend
military assistance to Pakistan for five years, with no need for assurances
that ISI assistance to the Taliban had ended.
So it continued, with US support. In 2010,
the massive batch of classified US
military cables released via Wikileaks documented how from 2004 to 2010, US
military intelligence knew full well that the ISI was supporting a wide range
of militant factions in Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan affiliated to
al-Qaeda and the Taliban, even while receiving billions of dollars of US
counterterrorism assistance. And a NATO intelligence report
leaked in 2012 similarly showed that the ISI was directly sponsoring the
Taliban, providing them safe havens, and even manipulating fighters and
arresting only those believed to be uncooperative with ISI orders.
So if it is, indeed, accurate to accuse
Pakistan of playing a 'double
game' in the ‘War on Terror’, what about the United States? The US Congressional Research
Service last year pointed out that after 9/11, “the United States has viewed Pakistan as a key
ally, especially in the context of counterterrorism and Afghan and regional
stability. Pakistan has been among the leading recipients of US foreign
assistance both historically and in recent years.”
This year, Pakistan
received $1.2 billion in US economic and security aid. Next year, while the
civilian portion of aid is being slashed over concerns about misuse of funds,
the US will still provide a total of around $1 billion. The military portion of this will help the
Pakistan military “to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN)
and counterterrorism (CT) operations against militants and also encourage
continued US-Pakistan military-to-military engagement.”
Calibrating
violence
US military aid in the name of
counterterrorism assistance has in other words directly supported the ISI even
while it has covertly sponsored the insurgency in Afghanistan. Why?
In 2009, I obtained a confidential report
commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which provided a
shocking explanation for this seemingly contradictory policy. The report,
authored by respected defence consultant Prof Ola Tunander who had previously
contributed to a high-level Danish government inquiry into US covert operations
during the Cold War, concluded that US strategy in AfPak is to “support both
sides in the conflict” so as to “calibrate the level of violence,” ironically to
prolong, not end, regional conflicts. This counterintuitive strategy, the
report argued, appears to be motivated by a wider geopolitical objective of maintaining
global support for US interventionism to maintain regional security. By fanning
the flames of war in AfPak, US forces are able to “increase and decrease the
military temperature and calibrate the level of violence” with a view to
permanently “mobilize other governments in support of US global policy.”
While pundits are now claiming that the
TTP, which broke away from the Afghan Taliban to begin targeting the Pakistani
state, is the avowed enemy of the ISI, the situation remains complicated. The
TTP still maintains relations with its Afghan counterpart for some operations,
members of which often flock to the TTP. And in 2009, an Independent
on Sunday investigation reported that despite having burned down 200 girls’
schools and conducted 165 bomb attacks against Pakistani security forces, local
politicians fleeing the attacks claimed that “elements of the military and the
militants appear to be acting together… The suspicion of collusion, said a
local government official in the largest town, Mingora, is based on the
proximity of army and Taliban checkposts, each ‘a mile away from the other.’”
Pakistani investigative journalist Amir Mir
noted
that far from being staffed by mullahs, the TTP’s shura councils are filled
with former Pakistani military and intelligence officials. The “large number of
ex-servicemen, including retired commissioned officers, as its members,” raised
disturbing questions about the extent to which disgruntled extremists inside
the ISI have been using the movement to impose their brutal Islamist ideology
not just in northwest Pakistan, but within the Pakistani state itself.
Silent
killings
Yet as TTP violence has escalated, the
Pakistani army has accelerated local military operations in response, just as
Obama has accelerated indiscriminate drone strikes across the region. Both
these approaches have tended to target not terrorists, but civilians. According
to Brown University’s Costs of War Project,
Pakistani security forces have conducted major offensives in the northwest Swat
Valley and neighbouring areas, killing “civilians with mortars, direct fire,
and with bombs... In some years, it appears that Pakistani security forces were
responsible for the majority of civilian killings,” as opposed to the TTP,
which is clearly brutal enough.
Indeed, while the TTP’s latest wanton
massacre of school children has captured public attention, the media has
remained essentially silent on the Pakistani military’s slaughter of up to a
hundred plus civilians through the first half of this year. No one knows the
true scale of the casualties, but the Bureau
for Investigative Journalism, analyzing public record news reports (which
themselves are conservative due to being based on official government claims),
found that the Pakistani airstrikes killed up to 540 people, and that as many
as 112 of these could have been civilians. Not a peep of condemnation from
either the mainstream media, or Pakistani diasporas in the west.
The CIA’s drone strikes are equally
counterproductive. A secret CIA
Directorate of Intelligence report just released via Wikileaks, reviewing
the record of drone strikes and counterinsurgency operations over the last
decades, admits that these “may increase support for the insurgents,
particularly if these strikes enhance insurgent leaders’ lore, if
non-combatants are killed in the attacks, if legitimate or semi-legitimate politicians
aligned with the insurgents are targeted, or if the government is already seen
as overly repressive or violent.”
Militarisation
is no solution
The rise of the TTP, which appears in some
ways even more extreme than its Afghan counterpart, is a direct result of the
massive, indiscriminate violence deployed by both the US and Pakistan in the
region – which feeds the grievances driving locals into the TTP’s ranks.
Denying that this violence radicalizes people on the ground is futile. The fact
is that the TTP was spawned as an ultra-extreme reaction to the ongoing
militarised approach to the region, which itself has slaughtered thousands
of civilians.
Yet the frankly disgusting double-game of
the US and Pakistani governments in the violence does not absolve the Taliban
and its offshoots from their own responsibility for mass murder. The twisted
ideology they use to justify their terrorist attacks against civilians, and
children no less, must be countered and de-legitimised.
But equally, the rampant expansion of this
ideology in areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan has been enabled by the
comprehensive breakdown of local institutions and basic economic
infrastructure, where alienation and resentment find their outlets through a violent
extremism fed by a fatal cocktail of covert foreign finance and selective ISI
sponsorship. The short-sighted obsession with military solutions coming from
both the US and Pakistani establishments, in this context, merely throws fuel
on the fire. Who will counter the entrenched ideologies behind these failed
military policies?
In theory, there is a way out. The US must
wind-down its self-serving obsession with military aid to Pakistan, much of
which is being used to finance the very enemies we are supposedly fighting.
Instead of providing billions of dollars of ‘counterterrorism’ focused aid to a
hopelessly corrupt government, such billions could be used in coordination with
the state to empower genuine grassroots networks like the Rural
Support Programmes and others with a proven track-record in enfranchising
communities in self-development and poverty alleviation. Only be empowering the
Pakistani people, can the country hope to begin moving towards a genuine democracy
based on a vibrant and engaged civil society.
From here, we may begin to see Pakistanis
themselves further developing their own indigenous conceptions of Islam,
drawing on the well-established Pakistani spiritual-cultural traditions
of peace and inclusiveness represented in the musical movements of eastern
classical, folk, qawwali, bhangra, Sufi and contemporary hip hop, rock and pop,
and represented by nationally-acclaimed cultural icons like Nusrat Fateh Ali
Khan and Junoon, among countless others. Such Pakistani cultural icons
demonstrate that truly populist approaches to Islam and spirituality are not
regressive, but progressive. The militant madrassas preaching exclusionary
violence and totalitarian politics in the name of Islam, are being propped up
not by local traditions, but by vast inputs of foreign
finance exporting an alien ideology over decades from the Gulf states,
particularly Saudi Arabia.
And there is a role in this for diaspora
communities to mobilize their wealth, expertise and resources to help build the
long-term capacity of Pakistani communities to resist and counter the alien
ideologies represented by movements like the Taliban – but the focus here must
be on crafting positive visions for the future, through meaningful
institution-building. More than that, diaspora communities, indeed western
citizens in general, need to recognize their fundamental responsibility to
engage critically and relentlessly to pressure western government institutions
and hold them to account for failed foreign policies pursued in our name that
are aggravating the AfPak quagmire.
Extremists are gleefully filling a vacuum
of despair cultivated by ruthless domestic corruption and callous international
geopolitics. It is never too late to begin cultivating the seeds of hope.
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